Sacramento Arena Deal
Collapses in Spectacular Fashion
It’s been hard to avert our eyes from the train wreck that
is the Sacramento Arena deal, especially since the Business Forecasting Center
just opened a satellite office in Sacramento and one of our professional
colleagues, Chris Thornberg of Beacon Economics, took center stage as a
consultant to the owners of the NBA’s Sacramento Kings. Thornberg questioned the revenue projections
underlying the arena financing assumptions, and questioned the City’s financing
plan and whether the deal was in the best interest of the City. The focus on the public benefit from the City’s
financing plan was odd for a consultant of the Kings. Presumably, the Kings would want to persuade
the City to increase their Arena subsidy, and it is hard to see how
highlighting the City’s financial risk and weak economy helps persuade the City
to improve the deal for the Kings. One
plausible explanation for the Sacramento bashing tactic is that the Maloofs are
trying to persuade the NBA that Sacramento is an unviable market so the league
will approve relocation to another city.
The Maloofs flip-flop and Thornberg’s harsh criticism of Sacramento
elected officials led to a heated public war of words, including dueling op-eds
in the Sacramento Bee between Thornberg and City Manager John Shirey.
Underlying the drama are objective economic and financial
calculations. Are the revenue and
economic projections realistic? Is it a
good business deal for the Sacramento Kings?
Is it a good deal for the City, or a looming financial disaster? An even more fundamental question is whether
a new arena generates enough new economic value to justify a $391 million
investment, regardless of who pays for it.
From the Kings’ financial perspective, the new downtown
City-owned arena must be compared to their current team-owned arena in Natomas,
and realistic future alternatives including relocation or even renovation of
the current arena. The Kings are
reported to be profitable, unlike most of their NBA peers playing in larger,
more modern arenas. The Kings would
contribute about $70 million in new arena construction costs, plus agree to a
5% ticket surcharge that would send several million dollars a year back to the
City. Even assuming a conservative $20
million annual revenue boost from a new arena, the Kings could support these direct
costs. However, there are a host of
additional provisions that likely make it a poor financial deal for the
Kings. In addition to the direct arena
costs, the Kings’ owners would no longer receive revenue from non-basketball
events at the current arena like they do currently at the team-owned Power
Balance Arena. The deal also locks them
into the Sacramento market for another thirty years in addition to a host of
other smaller concerns. The Kings’ best
strategy would seem to be to stay in the existing arena for a while, explore
its renovation, while waiting to see if Sacramento or another city makes a more
favorable offer as the economy and municipal finances improve.
What about the City? Is
the proposed arena deal a financial disaster?
It is definitely a fiscal risk, but whether it is a potential disaster depends
on your perspective and the civic value you place on an arena. Compared to other publically-financed arena
deals over the past twenty years, the deal is more protective for taxpayers
than many. While the City pays about 60%
of direct development costs, the City’s real contribution is significantly less
than 50% when revenues from a 5% ticket surcharge, profit sharing with arena
operator AEG, and other terms are included.
Although the economic development benefits of an arena are badly
overstated, it will bring some new net dollars to the region and the Arena is
clearly a civic amenity of some value. Despite
these positive aspects to the deal, it is still a significant public subsidy
and considerable risk for a City that is in the midst of a serious budget
crisis. The positive cash flow from
parking facilities is an asset the City of Sacramento has to get it through the
crisis that many similar cities lack.
Financing the arena could involve a 50-year lease on parking facilities
to fund an arena whose economic life will likely be less than fifty years. Some of those parking assets are in key
locations, and committing them to a parking lease for fifty years could entail
significant opportunity costs. The same
can be said for selling city-owned land such as the 100 acres in Natomas
adjacent to the current arena. The
City’s finance plan clearly adds new burdens to the municipal budget, even
though some arena costs will be “backfilled” with ticket surcharges and other
tax revenue. Some public expenditure for
an arena can be justified - all civic assets have costs - but the Mayor and
City Council have clearly pushed the City's side of the deal to its boundary, especially
considering the minimal contributions from the surrounding cities and the clear
unwillingness of taxpayers to support a dedicated arena tax in the past.The Mayor has worked hard to retain the Kings and has come up with the best proposal he could, one that pushes the City to its financial limit, and yet still doesn’t appear to be a better deal for the Kings than the alternatives, including the status quo. The inevitable conclusion is that, like most sports arenas in medium to small markets, a $391 million arena in downtown Sacramento simply doesn’t generate enough new value to equal its cost. No amount of financial engineering is likely to change that. The new arena is simply infeasible without an owner and/or a City that is both wealthy and passionate enough about pro basketball in Sacramento to overlook significant financial risks. Judging from recent events, both sides seem to have an abundance of passion, but a shortage of wealth.
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